The 2002 Doha Declaration confirmed that the TRIPS agreement should not prevent members from taking the necessary steps to protect public health. Despite this recognition, less developed countries have argued that flexible TRIPS provisions, such as mandatory licensing, are almost impossible to obtain. The least developed countries, in particular, have made their young domestic manufacturing and technological industries proof of the infallible policy. On the other hand, developing countries had little influence, although many were skeptical at first about the proposals and opposition to a TRIPS agreement was gradually overcome (Drahos, 2002). The promise of better access to the agriculture and textile markets, economic constraints from the threat of U.S. sanctions, the possible development of restrictive bilateral agreements on public emigration, and a general lack of awareness of the content of the proposals played their part (May-Sell, 2006: 157-158). As a result, TRIPS has reduced the interests of some of the company`s global players, and it is only by recognizing it that it can be well understood (Matthews, 2002: 4-5). This is the specific view of intellectual property, as promoted by Western multinationals and supported by governments embedded in the agreement. The subtle balance between private profit and the common good – the purpose and extent of intellectual property – has therefore been too low to the detriment of ip, and the consequences of how TRIPS operate despite their stated objectives are what we are now turning to. Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti argue that the importance of TRIPS in the process of developing and disseminating knowledge and innovation has been overestimated by its supporters. This was supported by the FINDINGs of the United Nations that many low-protection countries regularly benefit from significant foreign direct investment (FDI).  Analysis of OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (which extended the lifespan of drug patents by 6 years) showed that, although the total number of registered products increased slightly, the average innovation index remained unchanged.
 On the other hand, J-rg Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser (2017) find historical evidence that compulsory licensing – a key mechanism for weakening IP rights under Article 31 of TRIPS – can effectively lead to the promotion of inventions by increasing the threat to competition in areas of low competition. They argue, however, that the benefits of weakening intellectual property rights depend heavily on the ability of governments to make a credible commitment to use them only in exceptional cases, since companies can invest less in research and development if they expect repeated episodes of mandatory licensing.